If players are sparse social dilemmas are too: Importance of percolation
  for evolution of cooperation by Wang, Zhen et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
20
5.
26
87
v1
  [
ph
ys
ics
.so
c-p
h]
  1
1 M
ay
 20
12
If players are sparse social dilemmas are too:
Importance of percolation for evolution of cooperation
Zhen Wang,1, 2 Attila Szolnoki,3 and Matjazˇ Perc4, ∗
1School of Physics, Nankai University, Tianjin 300071, China
2Department of Physics, Hong Kong Baptist University, Kowloon Tong, Hong Kong
3Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Research Centre for Natural Sciences,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary
4Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Korosˇka cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia
Spatial reciprocity is a well known tour de force of cooperation promotion. A thorough understanding of the
effects of different population densities is therefore crucial. Here we study the evolution of cooperation in social
dilemmas on different interaction graphs with a certain fraction of vacant nodes. We find that sparsity may
favor the resolution of social dilemmas, especially if the population density is close to the percolation threshold
of the underlying graph. Regardless of the type of the governing social dilemma as well as particularities of
the interaction graph, we show that under pairwise imitation the percolation threshold is a universal indicator
of how dense the occupancy ought to be for cooperation to be optimally promoted. We also demonstrate that
myopic updating, due to the lack of efficient spread of information via imitation, renders the reported mechanism
dysfunctional, which in turn further strengthens its foundations.
Since the seminal paper on games and spatial chaos [1],
spatial reciprocity has been built upon as a powerful mech-
anism for the promotion of cooperation [2]. Alongside kin
and group selection [3, 4] as well as direct and indirect reci-
procity [5–9], it completes the list of the big five [10] held
responsible for why we tend to overcome our selfishness for
the greater common good. Aiding its popularity is certainly
the fact that its workings can be described in a couple of lines.
If the interactions amongst players are restricted to only a few
individuals by means of a graph, then cooperators can survive
by means of forming compact clusters, which minimizes the
potential exploitation by defectors and protects those that are
located in the interior of such clusters against an invasion. It is
along the lines of this observation that studies on the evolution
of cooperation have received a substantial boost, as evidenced
in several reviews that capture succinctly recent advances on
this topic [11–14].
One of the most notable spinoff discoveries stemming from
the early works on the importance of spatial structure [12, 15–
17] has been that complex networks, having the connectivity
structure similar to that of social networks, are very beneficial
for the evolution of cooperation [18–33]. More generally, it
was discovered that the heterogeneity or diversity allows for
cooperative behavior to prevail even if the temptations to de-
fect are large [34–38]. Recently, evolutionary games have also
been studied in growing populations [39, 40] and hierarchical
structures [41], thus elegantly continuing this line of research.
Another important avenue of research having its roots
firmly in spatial games is the study of disordered environ-
ments [42], which subsequently gave rise to studies clarify-
ing the role of mobility in different evolutionary settings [43–
48]. It is by now a fact that mobility of players can pave the
way towards a successful evolution of cooperation, even if the
conditions are noisy and do not necessarily favor the spread-
ing of cooperators. Apart from an early work on diluted lat-
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tices [42], however, the primary impact of population density
has not been explored. Given that the early experiments on
the behavior of rats under crowded conditions revealed that
too high population densities may induce a variety of destruc-
tive conditions, ranging from infant cannibalism over exces-
sive aggression to increased mortality at all ages [49], and that
it was later confirmed that similar effects of overcrowding can
be observed not just by rodents, but also by primates [50] and
humans [51], we are therefore motivated to examine in detail
the role of the population density by the resolution of social
dilemmas. For this purpose, we study the evolution of coop-
eration in the prisoner’s dilemma, the snowdrift game and the
stag-hunt game on different lattices. All the simulation details
are described in the Methods, while here we proceed with pre-
senting the results.
Results
As motivational results presented in Fig. 1(a) demonstrate,
the usage of “choosing the best” strategy updating rule, dur-
ing which a player follows unconditionally the strategy of its
neighbor that has the largest payoff, has a detrimental impact
on the outcome of social dilemmas on diluted lattices. Due
to its deterministic nature, strategy updating by choosing the
best player in the neighborhood frequently leads to the system
being trapped into a frozen state, which however, does not
correspond to its global optimum. Moreover, the final state
depends sensitively on the initial configuration [42, 52], es-
pecially at lower densities of players (low values of ρ). To
avoid unwanted properties of deterministic strategy updating,
we employ a stochastic updating rule with a direct noise pa-
rameter that allows “irrational” behavior, albeit with a small
probability. This leads to qualitatively different results that
become independent of the initial state if ρ exceeds 0.2. As
Fig. 1(b) highlights, there are intermediate population densi-
ties that play a more prominent and consistent role. Motivated
by these results, we proceed with using the pairwise stochastic
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FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the popula-
tion density ρ for different values of the temptation to defect b (see
legend), as obtained for the prisoner’s dilemma game on the square
lattice under sequential updating. Results in panel (a) were obtained
with the “choosing the best” strategy updating rule following [42],
while results in panel (b) were obtained by means of a stochastic
version of the same rule. If players are no longer forced to strictly
adopt the strategy of their best neighbor, the fC(ρ) dependence
changes dramatically, exhibiting a consistent optimum at an interme-
diate value of ρ. This is because frozen states that do not correspond
to the global optimum, as well as the sensitivity on initial conditions,
especially at low ρ values, are avoided. Introducing some uncertainty
to strategy adoptions [panel (b)] thus helps to reveal a more interest-
ing impact of population density as was previously reported to exist.
imitation w(sx → sy) (see Eq. 1) introduced in the Methods.
Our goal is to explore how the cooperation level depends on ρ,
and how robust the outcomes are if using different host latices.
As described in the Methods, a direct comparison is possible
by means of normalizingK (the uncertainty by strategy adop-
tions) with k (the degree that characterizes different lattices).
Since it represents the hardest social dilemma to solve,
we stay with the focus on the prisoner’s dilemma game, and
present in Fig. 2 its outcome on four different lattices in de-
pendence on the population density ρ. It can be observed
that there always exists an intermediate value of ρ at which
the fraction of cooperators fC is maximal. Depending on the
temptation to defect b and the type of the interaction graph,
however, the maxima of fC occur at different ρ. A closer in-
spection reveals that in fact the shifts are strongly related to
the percolation thresholds [53] of the underlying lattices. Ac-
cordingly, in panel (b) the maxima occur at the highest values
of ρ, as the honeycomb lattice indeed has the highest perco-
lation threshold (pi = 0.6527) amongst the four considered
lattices. Conversely, the cubic lattice [see panel (d)], having
pi = 0.2488, requires the lowest density (largest sparsity) of
players for the evolution of cooperation to be optimally pro-
moted.
Apart from the graph-specific dependence of the optimal ρ,
there are also general features common to all four interactions
graphs. In the ρ→ 0 limit the majority of players will have no
neighbors, and hence fC simply mirrors back the initial state
that is ρ = 0.5. As ρ increases, the few existing links between
players enable defectors to exploit cooperators without hav-
ing to fear the consequences of spatial reciprocity. Note that
for sufficiently small ρ many players, as well as large por-
tions of the graph as a whole, will still be disconnected, hence
prohibiting cooperators to form compact clusters and utiliz-
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FIG. 2: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the popula-
tion density ρ for different values of the temptation to defect b (see
legend), as obtained for the prisoner’s dilemma game on the square
lattice [panel (a)], the honeycomb lattice [(panel (b)], the triangular
lattice [(panel (c)] and the cubic lattice [(panel (d)]. It can be ob-
served that, regardless of the type of the underlying interaction graph,
there always exists and intermediate value of ρ at which fC is maxi-
mal. More importantly, if b is close to the critical value at which co-
operators would normally die out, the optimal population density is
strongly related to the percolation threshold of the interaction graph.
For the square lattice the latter is pi = 0.5, for the honeycomb lattice
it is pi = 0.6527, for the triangular lattice it is pi = 0.3472, while
for the cubic lattice it is pi = 0.2488. Accordingly, percolation plays
a key role by the resolution of social dilemmas by means of drasti-
cally elevating the effectiveness of spatial reciprocity. Error bars are
comparable to the size of symbols.
ing spatial reciprocity to protect themselves against invading
defectors. Because of the random initial state, the initial inva-
sion of defectors will always be successful, regardless of the
value of b. But further invasions are subsequently hindered
by the lack of connections between players that are utilizing
different strategies, and hence at low values of ρ the decay
of fC is universal for all values of b. For larger ρ, however,
the outcome becomes independent of the initial state and the
temptation to defect more and more crucial. For higher values
of b the fC trend simply continues downward as ρ increases,
which indicates that new cooperative players simply serve as
“sitting ducks” for defectors. At lower values of b cooperators
are able to utilize the enhanced interconnectedness between
them to form compact clusters, while at the same time bene-
fiting from the dilution that prohibits defectors to exploit them
with the same efficiency as on a fully populated graph. Ac-
cordingly, fC peaks at an intermediate (optimal) value of ρ,
which is a bit higher but close to the percolation threshold of
the underlying interaction graph [53]. The fact that it is a bit
higher is simply a consequence of the fact that not all players
will be cooperators, and hence for cooperation to start perco-
lating the fraction needs to be somewhat higher to offset the
defectors.
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FIG. 3: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the population
density ρ for different values of the cost-to-benefit ration r (see leg-
end), as obtained on the square lattice for the snowdrift [panel (a)]
and the stag-hunt [(panel (b)] game by using strategy imitation de-
fined by Eq. 1. For the snowdrift game the results are qualitatively
identical as for the prisoner’s dilemma game in that there exists an
intermediate value of ρ where fC is maximal. Since the stag-hung
game is a less severe social dilemma, the exceeding of the percola-
tion threshold is sufficient for eliciting the all-C state. Regardless of
the governing social dilemma, however, the percolation threshold is
an important benchmark for how high a population density ought to
be for cooperation to thrive. Error bars are comparable to the size of
symbols.
Results presented in Fig. 3 for the snowdrift [panel (a)] and
the stag-hunt game [panel (b)] further add to the general va-
lidity of the outlined mechanism. The percolation threshold
still marks the advent of enhanced cooperation, although for
the stag-hunt game [panel (b)], which is in itself more lenient
for the evolution of cooperation, the all-C state rather than an
optimum in fC sets in. Along with the results reported previ-
ously for the multi-player interaction public goods game [54],
this leads us to the conclusion that a population density close
to the percolation threshold is optimal for the successful evo-
lution of cooperation. In particular, the players are connected
enough to transfer the more advantageous mutually beneficial
cooperative strategy, while simultaneously the graph is diluted
enough for the defectors to be unable to invade cooperators
effectively. Crucial for this scenario to be valid is thus perco-
lation, and directly related to that the fact that information can
spread efficiently by means of stochastic strategy imitation.
The validity of this argument can be tested effectively by
replacing the strategy updating via imitation by the so-called
myopic strategy updating rule [55, 56]. In this case, every
player makes decisions locally as an individual, always as-
suming an unchanged neighborhood (see Methods for details).
If the more successful strategy is not adopted, the existence or
absence of the percolation of players becomes an uncritical
property of the interaction topology, and hence it is expected
that the outlined mechanism will no longer work. Results pre-
sented in Fig. 4 fully confirm this expectation, as indeed nei-
ther for the prisoner’s dilemma [panel (a)] nor for the snow-
drift game [panel (b)] a decisive importance of an intermedi-
ate population density cannot be observed. As the population
density increases, the fraction of cooperators decays more or
less fast in the prisoner’s dilemma game, indicating that the
new connections amongst players mainly serve the defecting
strategy by allowing an ever increasing efficiency of local ex-
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FIG. 4: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the population
density ρ, as obtained on the square lattice under myopic updating
(see Eq. 2), for the prisoner’s dilemma [panel (a)] and the snow-
drift game [panel (b)]. Regardless of the governing temptation to
defect b, in the prisoner’s dilemma game the population density has a
monotonous impact on fC . In the snowdrift game, however, the my-
opic updating can lead to a role-separating distribution of Cs and Ds
that is reminiscent of anti-ferromagnetic order. Yet the increase of
cooperation stemming from this is practically negligible, especially
if compared to the results presented in Fig. 3(a), where imitation was
used as the driving force behind the evolution of strategies. These
observations confirm that the mechanism by means of which the per-
colation threshold is established as the optimal population density
for the resolution of social dilemmas relies on the percolation of co-
operators and the directly related effective spread of information via
strategy imitation. Myopic updating hinders the later, and hence the
mechanism becomes dysfunctional. Error bars are comparable to the
size of symbols.
ploitation. The situation for the snowdrift game, shown in
Fig. 4(b), is a bit different because the myopic strategy updat-
ing allows for the emergence of a role-separating distribution
of Cs and Ds independently on the value of r, which is rem-
iniscent of anti-ferromagnetic order [56]. The increase in the
level of cooperation, however, is significantly lower than re-
ported in Fig. 3(a) for imitation.
The outcomes of the stag-hunt game under myopic updat-
ing presented in Fig. 5 also agree with our expectations, only
that in this case r = 0.5 constitutes a transition point, above
(below) which a pure D (C) phase evolves. Accordingly, in-
creasing ρ towards one simply drives the system towards the
expected state. The percolation threshold plays not role at all.
Exactly at r = 0.5, however, both the pure C and the pure D
phase are equally probable. At low population densities (left
and middle snapshot) both phases can coexist isolated from
one another, hence yielding fC = 0.5, while at sufficiently
high populations densities (right snapshot) a pure phase will
eventually be reached (not shown) but since both outcomes are
equally probable fC is again 0.5. Regardless of the studied so-
cial dilemma, and also regardless of the type of the interaction
graph, myopic updating cannot support an efficient transfer of
information between the players, and thus renders the reach-
ing of the percolation threshold with the population density
irrelevant. This in turn confirms the validity of our arguments
and establishes the percolation threshold as the key property
of a graph that determine the optimal population density.
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FIG. 5: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the population
density ρ, as obtained on the square lattice under myopic updating
(see Eq. 2), for the stag-hunt game. As reported for the prisoner’s
dilemma and the snowdrift game in Fig. 4, here too the population
density has a monotonous impact, which however depends on the
value of the cost-to-benefit ratio r. If r < 0.5 the final destination
is the all-C phase, and accordingly, increasing ρ leads progressively
towards this solution. Conversely, for r > 0.5 the final outcome on
the fully populated lattice is the all-D phase, and thus as ρ increases
fC decays. At r = 0.5, however, there is a transition from the pure
C to the pure D phase, and in fact on a fully populated lattice both
are equally probable, hence fC = 0.5. For low values of ρ, how-
ever, the manifestation of fC = 0.5 is not by means of an eventual
evolution of either a pure C or a pure D phase, but rather by the si-
multaneous yet isolated coexistence of both phases, as demonstrated
by the characteristic snapshots in the bottom row left (ρ = 0.2) and
middle (ρ = 0.5). If ρ is sufficiently large, however, the original so-
lution is recovered. The right snapshot was obtained at ρ = 0.8 and
demonstrates such a scenario, but the stationary state (which will be
either a pure C or a pure D phase) is not yet reached. In the snap-
shots (bottom row) white denotes vacant sites, while green and red
are cooperators and defectors, respectively.
Discussion
Previous studies highlighted that imitation plays a decisive
role by the evolution of strategies amongst humans. By build-
ing on this fact, we have shown that the percolation threshold
of the matrix that determines the interactions between play-
ers constitutes the optimal population density for the resolu-
tion of social dilemmas that are governed by pairwise interac-
tions. For the mechanism to work, some level of uncertainty
by strategy adoptions is crucial as it prevents the system being
trapped into a frozen state, and it alleviates the dependence
on initial conditions, especially if the population density is
high. We have demonstrated that the results are valid for all
social dilemma games and on a wide class of different lattices,
which together with the previous results on the public goods
game that is governed by group interactions [54], firmly so-
lidifies the percolation threshold as the crucial property that
determines the optimal population density for the evolution of
cooperation. As a reverse test, we have verified the validity
of our arguments by means of the myopic updating rule, un-
der which players are no longer able to exchange information
directly between each other. Expectedly, we have found that
the percolation threshold no longer has a decisive impact on
the outcome of the three considered social dilemmas. This
confirms that the percolation threshold constitutes the optimal
population density for the resolution of social dilemmas by en-
suring the percolation of cooperators and the directly related
effective spread of information via strategy imitation.
It can be argued that the optimal population density ampli-
fies the mechanism of spatial reciprocity [1]. If the popula-
tion density is too low, vacant sites prohibit the formation of
compact clusters by cutting short the communication paths be-
tween the cooperators. Too high populations densities, on the
other hand, enable an effective invasion of defectors, which
again disrupts reciprocity amongst cooperators by splitting
them up into isolated clusters. Presented results thus allow
us to understand the impact of population density on the reso-
lution of social dilemmas through the concept of percolation,
and by doing so they provide an interesting interdisciplinary
link between statistical physics and the evolution of coopera-
tion.
Methods
Within this work we consider the spatial prisoner’s
dilemma, the spatial snowdrift and the spatial stag-hunt game.
In all three games players can choose either to cooperate
(sx = C = 1) or to defect (sx = D = 0), whereby mu-
tual cooperation yields the reward R, mutual defection leads
to punishment P , and the mixed choice gives the coopera-
tor the sucker’s payoff S and the defector the temptation T .
Depending on the rank of these four payoffs we have the
prisoner’s dilemma game if T > R > P > S, the snow-
drift game if T > R > S > P , and the stag-hunt game if
R > T > P > S. For simplicity, we here take R = 1 and
P = 0, which imposes boundaries on the remaining two pay-
offs of the form −1 ≤ S ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ T ≤ 2. Further zoom-
ing in on the most relevant features of the three dilemmas, we
take for the prisoner’s dilemma the temptation to defect T = b
and the punishment for mutual defection P = 0 [1], for the
snowdrift game we take T = 1+ r and S = 1− r [57], while
for the stag-hunt game we use T = r and S = −r, where r
in both cases is the cost-to-benefit ratio. As interaction graphs
that characterize the topology of the matrix containing play-
ers, we employ the square, honeycomb, triangular and the cu-
bic lattice, each with linear size L and only a fraction ρ of
occupied nodes. The remaining 1 − ρ nodes are left vacant.
The random dilution is performed only once at the start of the
game.
Following the initialization, we carry out Monte Carlo sim-
ulations comprising the following elementary steps. First, a
randomly selected player x acquires its payoff px by playing
the game with its k neighbors, as specified by the underlying
interaction graph. Next, one randomly chosen neighbor, de-
noted by y, also acquires its payoff py by playing the game
with its four neighbors. Lastly, player x tries to enforce its
5strategy sx on player y in accordance with the probability
w(sx → sy) =
1
1 + exp[(py − px)/(kK)]
(1)
whereK determines the level of uncertainty by strategy adop-
tions [12], which can be attributed to errors in judgment due to
mistakes and external influences that affect the evaluation of
the opponent. Without loss of generality we set K = 0.1 nor-
malized with the degree of the underlying lattice k, implying
that better performing players are readily imitated, but it is not
impossible to adopt the strategy of a player performing worse.
Each Monte Carlo step (MCS) gives a chance for every player
to enforce its strategy onto one of the neighbors (if they exist,
which at sufficiently small ρwill not be the case) once on aver-
age. The average density of cooperators fC = ρ−1L−2
∑
x sx
is determined in the stationary state after sufficiently long re-
laxation times. Depending on the actual conditions the linear
system size was varied from L = 200 to 1200 and the relax-
ation time was varied from 104 to 106 MCS to ensure proper
accuracy. The presented results are independent of the system
size and valid in the large size limit.
As an alternative to imitation we also consider the my-
opic updating rule, where instead of comparing payoffs with
a neighboring player and determining w(sx → sy) as the
probability of strategy transfer (see Eq. 1), a randomly cho-
sen player x changes its strategy sx to the other strategy s′x
with a probability
q(s′x → sx) =
1
1 + exp[(px − p′x)/(kK)]
(2)
where px and p′x are the payoffs of player x when playing sx
and s′x in its neighborhood. The simulation details and the
determination of fC , however, are the same as by imitation.
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